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When Diversity Works: The Effects of Coalition
Composition on the Success of Lobbying
Coalitions
Wiebke Marie Junk University of Copenhagen
Abstract: Lobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind
spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying
success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad
support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within
the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set
comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship
between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas
the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for
understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.
Replication Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results,
procedures and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PGGBB4.
The questions of whether, when, and how lob-byists can get policy outcomes to reflect theirpreferences have intrigued political scientists
for many decades (Leech 2010; Schattschneider 1960;
Truman 1958). One relative blind spot in this literature
is, however, the success of lobbying coalitions, actively
joining forces on specific issues. Lobbyists are not lone
wolves. On the contrary, they usually work in packs
(Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015, 214) and use coalition
action as one of the most prominent lobbying strategies
(Baumgartner et al. 2009, 180; Hojnacki et al. 2012, 389;
Nelson and Yackee 2012; Nownes 2006). Although the
advocacy literature has long attested that “lobbying is
a collective enterprise” (Klu¨ver 2013, 59) and explored
factors explaining coalition formation or behavior
within coalitions (Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson
2014; Gray and Lowery 1998; Heaney and Leifeld 2018;
Hojnacki 1997;Holyoke 2008, 2009;Hula 1999;Mahoney
2007b; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), the success
of active lobbying coalitions in attaining their policy
preferences is rarely put to an empirical test.
Instead, most studies of advocacy success treat single
lobbyists as independent units of analysis. Although
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some include information on the size or resources of
lobbying “camps” or “sides” promoting the same policy
position (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Klu¨ver 2013;Mahoney
and Baumgartner 2015), they typically overlook active
cooperation between these actors. Exceptions are a few
studies using network characteristics to explain selected
measures of lobbying influence, which show that ties be-
tween groups affect perceived influence of groups in the
network (Heaney 2014) or that well-connected groups
are more likely to attain their preferences in the judicial
venue (Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt 2013).
In contrast, and quite surprisingly, other studies on
issue-specific coalitions have found a negative relation-
ship between coalition membership and the likelihood of
lobbying success on the issue (Haider-Markel 2006; Ma-
honey and Baumgartner 2004). One potential reason for
these findings is that aggregate effects might be mislead-
ing because benefits of coalition lobbying may “not hold
across the board” (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004, 11).
In this article, I probe the conditions for the success
of lobbying coalitions by testing the effects of coalition
composition and issue characteristics on lobbying success
at the level of active coalitions on specific policy issues.
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The theory I propose expands on the signaling role of
coalitions (Hojnacki 1997, 62; Mahoney 2007b, 368; Ma-
honey and Baumgartner 2004; Nelson and Yackee 2012),
which constitutes a potential pathway to increased lobby-
ing success: A coalition can indicate the overall strength
and diversity of support for a policy proposal to policy
makers, thus “signaling” political importance of the coali-
tion members’ interest. However, this role is unlikely to
hold equally for all coalitions and in all circumstances.
First, the appeal of such a signal to policy makers should
depend on the composition of the coalition (cf. Nelson and
Yackee 2012, 340), especially on the societal and economic
interests represented by it. A signal sent by a coalition of
environmental organizations, for instance, will signal less
broad support than a signal sent by a union of “strange
bedfellows” (Beyers andDeBruycker 2018;Holyoke 2009,
363;Mahoney 2007b, 375; Phinney 2017) of environmen-
tal and business groups. Second, the theory is refined by
adding that the effect of coalition diversity will be con-
ditioned by the characteristics of the policy issue at stake
because these affect expected responsiveness by policy
makers to the signal, as well as contributions of coalition
participants to the common effort. I argue that advocacy
salience (cf. Beyers, Du¨r, and Wonka 2018) is a crucial
conditioning factor in these regards. When an issue is
salient in the lobbying community, policy makers will be
more wary of political repercussions of policy outcomes
that lack broad support. Furthermore, when outside pres-
sures are high, because many advocates compete on an
issue, there are higher incentives for members inside the
diverse coalition to overcome cooperation problems and
lobby together more efficiently.
The hypotheses are tested on a new and unique data
set of lobbyingonadiverse set of 50 issues in fiveEuropean
countries, namely, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Rasmussen, Ma¨der,
and Reher 2018). Information on active coalitions con-
ducting joined campaigning or lobbying of policymakers
was collected in an issue-specific survey completed by 478
active advocates. In order to separate out the hypothesized
benefits of coalition diversity, the unit of analysis is an ac-
tive coalition in the sample of selected issues, and 122
distinct coalitions were identified as jointly advocating
policy demands on 37 issues.
The results support the hypothesis that advocacy
salience moderates the benefits of coalition diversity. On
salient issues, more diverse coalitions have significantly
higher preference attainment than less diverse coalitions.
On issues with low salience, however, coalition diversity
is associated negatively with lobbying success, suggesting
that internal cooperation costs outweigh the benefits of
diversity. This pattern does not seem driven by variation
in coalition diversity between low- and high-salience is-
sues, but the relationship between diversity and lobbying
success reverses as salience increases. Importantly, the ar-
ticle adds to previous studies of advocacy success that
have highlighted a similar conditioning effect of advo-
cacy salience on the effect of public support (Rasmussen,
Ma¨der, and Reher 2018) and the relative size of an actor’s
lobbying camp (Klu¨ver 2011). Both of these factors can
be seen as forms of broad political support other than
actively lobbying in a diverse lobbying coalition. Taken
together, these findings are highly consequential for un-
derstandingdecisions indemocratic politics,whichmight
primarily be responsive to signals of broad societal sup-
port when there are high levels of mobilization on an
issue, but, perhaps worryingly, not on issues that attract
less attention. In this way, the article speaks in a novel way
to long-standing questions on the responsiveness of pol-
icy makers to different types of interests (Schattschneider
1960; Truman 1958). The findings are relevant for schol-
ars of policy processes, interest representation, and lob-
bying success. Crucially, they provide evidence that policy
makers reward diversity in mobilization, yet that differ-
ences between issues strongly affect the costs and benefits
associated with uniting support from different types of
societal groups.
Theory: The Benefits and Costs
of Coalition Diversity
In essence, understanding the effects of (different types
of) coalitions requires assessing how and when positive
effects of cooperation exceed its costs. The literature on
coalition formation depicts lobbying coalitions as costly
arrangements, which groups avoid if they are resourceful
enough on their own (Gray and Lowery 1998; Hojnacki
1997; Holyoke 2009; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2007b). Other
than coordination and reputational costs associated with
forming coalitions in the first place, lobbying together
involves continuous coordination costs and collective
action problems, such as free riding or competition for
reputation and leadership (Heaney and Leifeld 2018;
Holyoke 2008; Hula 1999; Olson 1965; Strolovitch 2014,
195). Arguably, such issues can hinder the choice and
implementation of optimal strategies aimed at influenc-
ing policy outcomes as a coalition, and thus decrease
preference attainment of the coalition and its members.
These collective action costs might be one explanation
for why some existing studies find a negative aggregate
effect of coalition strategies on the lobbying success of
individual lobbyists (Haider-Markel 2006; Mahoney and
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Baumgartner 2004).1 In contrast, Nelson and Yackee
(2012) document that joining forces in lobbying can
increase the likelihood of preference attainment—under
certain conditions. Based on data on 19 regulations by
seven United States federal agencies, they show that when
the coalition is larger and has reached consensus on its
preferred policy direction, the individual coalition par-
ticipant is more likely to attain her preference compared
to lobbying alone. The authors reason that such (larger,
unanimous) coalitions reap benefits by meeting policy
makers’ demands “for clear political signals regarding the
overall strength of support or opposition to a policy pro-
posal” (Nelson and Yackee 2012, 340). Other than size,
however, decision makers can be expected to care about
the types of interests represented in the coalition because
the interpretation of the signal will vary depending
on the set of actors sending it. From a signaling per-
spective, not all (equally large) coalitions should be born
equal. A signal stemming from a coalition of three work-
ers’ rights organizations may, for instance, be interpreted
as less informationally valuable than a signal sent together
by a trade union and a sectoral business organization be-
cause itmeans that different socioeconomic interests have
found consensus. Along these lines, Mahoney (2007b,
368) argues that a coalition may ideally signal “support
of a large and varied group of interests.” Crucially, this
expectation is based on an implicit pluralist assumption
that policy makers have incentives to maximize the types
of interests supporting a policy outcome. In fact, it can be
seen as one of the core questions of democratic politics
whether policy makers are responsive to more diverse
support when deciding on policy outcomes. The next
sections revisit pluralist theory to formulate hypotheses
about how and when diverse coalitions convey an
appealing signal of support to policy makers, potentially
resulting in benefits of cooperation that exceed the costs
of cooperating within diverse coalitions.
A Pluralist Perspective on Coalition Signals
In pluralist theory, emphasis lies on the value and suc-
cess of a “polyarchy” of actors (Dahl 1961). Most fa-
mously, Truman (1958, 514) developed a view on interest
group multiplicity and diversity as a “balance wheel” in
the American political system. He argued that the dis-
turbance of any economic or social interest can lead to
interest mobilization. According to Truman (1958, 511),
all potential groups have “a minimum of influence in the
1Another potential explanation is endogeneity in that groups an-
ticipating failure (alone) may be more likely to join forces.
political process” because policy makers fearing electoral
punishment take into account all groups whose interests
might otherwise create a “disturbance.” In practice, the
likelihood of actual future mobilization and its conse-
quences will be unknown to policy makers, but we might
expect them to gauge these risks based on signals from
present lobbying activity. From this perspective, policy
makers should respond favorably to diversity in the types
of interests that support a policy outcome, as this should
minimize the likelihood of powerful backlash in the
form of cross-societal demonstrations, strikes, or cam-
paigns to hold policymakers to account for particularistic
decisions.
Existing studies have assessed interest group diversity
from a population perspective (Boehmke 2002; Gray and
Lowery 1993) and regarding activity on consultations
(Rasmussen and Carroll 2014), as well as its importance
for the behavior of coalition members (Heaney and
Leifeld 2018) and for recruiting participants (Heaney
and Rojas 2014). Moreover, Phinney (2017) has provided
a rich qualitative analysis of the role of diverse coalitions
in the context of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 in the United
States. Yet, surprisingly, measures of diversity hardly
feature in models of lobbying success, albeit diversity of
support or opposition can be expected to be a relevant
aspect informing policy decisions.
Applied to the level of coalition success, diverse coali-
tions can signal to policy makers that there is broad sup-
port for or opposition to a policy. An active coalition on
an issue between similar organizations, say Greenpeace
and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), conveys less broad
support than a coalition between different group types,
for instance, theWWFand abusiness association. The lat-
ter union between a public interest group and economic
actors will presumably entail a broader support base that
can carry or oppose a potential policy outcome. In the
words of Mahoney (2007b, 375), diverse coalitions can
ultimately send an electoral signal to policy makers “that
a large majority of the electorate will likely support them,
if they support this proposal,” so legislators can “vote for
thiswithout concern for negative political consequences.”
Put differently by Phinney (2017, 3), diverse coalitions
can supply different informational resources with higher
credibility and, hence, “‘reduce legislators’ uncertainty
regarding the consequences of policy change.” Based on
these arguments, one can expect policymakers to bemore
likely to respond to signals from more diverse coalitions,
so coalition diversity should have a beneficial effect on the
coalition’s likelihood to attain its policy preference. Hy-
pothesis 1 summarizes this first expectation of a general
positive effect of coalition diversity on coalition success.
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H1: Themore diverse a coalition in terms of substan-
tive group types it unites, the more likely it is to
attain its policy preference.
Costs and Benefits of Diversity and the
Moderating Effect of Salience
One may object, however, that this argument ignores the
cost term of lobbying as a diverse coalition. On the one
hand, we may expect this to be higher than for homoge-
nous coalitions. Coalitions between “strange bedfellows”
arguably bear higher internal cooperation costs, even af-
ter they have formed. Larger ideological distance between
actors might complicate efficient strategy choice and im-
plementation, for instance, due to potential conflicts with
themember base (Holyoke 2009, 363).On the other hand,
as Heaney and Leifeld (2018) show, diversity (in partisan
affiliations) can also increase the contributions made to
the common effort by coalition members, perhaps be-
cause the stakes are high once these reputationally risky
coalitions have formed (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018).
Looking at grassroots groups, Walker and Stepick (2014,
959) discuss that group diversity has the potential to both
benefit the common effort because “heterogeneity helps
organizations to resolve collective action dilemmas,” as
well as to “thwart [ . . . ] the formation of collective iden-
tities and group solidarity, and therefore limit [ . . . ] the
potential for effective organizing.” In order to understand
the net effect of coalition diversity, it is crucial to inquire
when this positive potential plays out and trumps coor-
dination costs. Importantly, as I argue in this article, the
characteristics of the policy issue can be expected to affect
both the considerations of coalition participants as well
as those of policymakers, thus impacting the sizes of costs
and benefits of lobbying as a diverse coalition.
First, as implied by Heaney and Leifeld (2018), when
the stakes are high, contribution incentives within the di-
verse coalition to facilitate cooperation toward the com-
mon effort should be higher. One can argue that the
pressures associated with high issue salience can act as
a uniting force within a diverse coalition, giving partic-
ipants higher incentives to overcome internal coopera-
tion problems between unlike partners or convince their
member base of the necessity of reaching a common de-
nominator. On salient issues, the costs of potential failure
and reputational damage are higher for all coalitionmem-
bers, given external pressures such as higher visibility and
competition with actors outside the coalition. Therefore,
cooperation costs within the diverse coalition should be
minimized on more salient issues because contribution
incentives for its members can be expected to be higher.
Conversely, on low-salience issues, incentives to smooth
cooperationbetween thediverse partners shouldbe lower,
so one can expect higher internal conflict and cooperation
costs stemming from diversity within the coalition.
Second, one can argue that the responsiveness of pol-
icy makers to a diverse coalition signal is also unlikely to
be the same across issues. Policy makers should fear neg-
ative political consequences of their decisions especially
when there is already more attention and activity on an
issue. On more salient issues, for which many interests
have already mobilized, the risk and extent of negative
backlash increases. In these cases, a coalition signal of di-
verse support from different societal interests should be
especially appealing to policy makers seeking to insulate
themselves from negative political consequences. Con-
versely, ignoring such a signal could be especially costly if
many societal interests have already mobilized. On low-
salience issues, in contrast, such incentives to respond to
diverse coalition signals should be lower, as broader re-
sistance or support would first need to mobilize before
posing an actual threat. In sum, the signaling benefits of
a diverse coalition should be higher on more salient is-
sues because political responsiveness to the signal can be
expected to be higher.
For these reasons, I expect a moderating effect of
salience on the effect of coalition diversity. On low-
salience issues, cooperation costswithin diverse coalitions
are expected to be higher, and benefits of signaling lower.
As salience increases, incentives to optimize cooperation
between the dissimilar partners should increase, as well
as the benefits of signaling diversity to policy makers.
Table 1 sketches these expectations to sum up how the
costs and benefits from cooperation in diverse coalitions
are expected to vary between low- and high-salience
issues.
In fact, issue salience has long been central to stud-
ies of advocacy and has been shown to affect lobbying
success in attaining preferences or winning governmen-
tal allies (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015; Rasmussen,
Ma¨der, and Reher 2018). However, existing findings are
mixed regarding the direction of its effect (e.g., Bunea
2013; Mahoney 2007a; Rasmussen, Ma¨der, and Reher
2018). A potential reason for this is that the effect of
salience may be differential, rather than equally affecting
preference attainment of all lobbyists. Importantly, Ras-
mussen, Ma¨der, and Reher (2018) show that the number
of advocates active on an issue amplifies the effect of
public support on lobbying success: As the number of
active interests increases, advocates benefit more from
having public opinion on their side. This measure of ac-
tivity in the lobbying community can be termed advocacy
salience and seen as one of the different facets of salience
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TABLE 1 Variation in Expected Effects of Diversity inside the Coalition
Low Salience High Salience
Costs of Diversity ↑ Cooperation Costs ↓ Cooperation Costs
(– contribution incentives) (+ contribution incentives)
Benefits of Diversity ↓Signaling Benefits ↑ Signaling Benefits
(– responsiveness to signal) (+ responsiveness to signal)
(Beyers, Du¨r, and Wonka 2018). Somewhat similarly,
Klu¨ver (2011) has shown that advocacy salience during
EU online consultation processes moderates the effect
of the relative size of an actor’s lobbying camp. Higher
advocacy salience increases the likelihood of preference
attainment for actors in the relatively larger lobbying
camp on an issue, and it decreases predicted success of
actors belonging to the smaller camp. These two stud-
ies show that advocacy salience moderates the effects of
two factors that convey support or opposition for a pol-
icy position: public support and support by larger shares
of the lobbying community (i.e., larger “camps”). These
findings resonate with the theory formulated above that
higher levels of interest mobilization on an issue increase
incentives for political responsiveness to broad support
signals. In the same manner, I expect coalition diver-
sity to convey a signal of support, which policy makers
will be especially responsive to when there is higher ad-
vocacy salience. In addition, I expect the external pres-
sures induced by higher advocacy salience to affect the
internal dynamics within the diverse coalition favorably.
Hypothesis 2 is formulated based on this expected pat-
tern of increasing benefits and decreasing costs of co-
operating within diverse coalitions as advocacy salience
increases.
H2: As advocacy salience increases, there is an in-
creasingly positive effect of coalition diversity on
preference attainment.
The next section outlines the research design emplo-
yed to test Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Method: Capturing Active Lobbying
Coalitions
One potential reason for the scarcity of quantitative
research on coalition success is that data collection
on a sufficiently large number of active coalitions is
highly labor intensive. Passive “coalitions” in the form
of lobbying camps favoring the same policy outcome
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Klu¨ver 2013; Mahoney and
Baumgartner 2015) can be identified based on gathering
the positions of all active actors on an issue. Even this is
resource intensive on a larger set of policy issues, which
is why some studies rely on simpler proxies for interest
group preferences (Gilens and Page 2014). Capturing, in
addition to these, active cooperation between actors re-
quires collecting even more information, some of which
is private, as coalitions do not always leave traces. To en-
able the present study, an online survey was sent to 1,410
active advocates on 50 policy issues as part of the GovLis
Project on government responsiveness2 (Rasmussen,
Ma¨der, and Reher 2018; see also Flo¨the and Rasmussen
2019; Junk and Rasmussen 2019; Rasmussen and Reher
2019; Rasmussen, Reher, and Toshkov 2019; Romeijn
2018). This survey collected information on issue-specific
“signaling coalitions,” meaning coalitions that jointly
campaigned in public or concertedly approached policy
makers.
Sampling of Issues and Active Advocates
The sample of issues included 10 issues per country in
five European countries, namely, Denmark (DK), Swe-
den (SE), the Netherlands (NL), Germany (GE), and
the United Kingdom (UK). These countries vary in size
and (corporatist versus pluralist) interest group systems
(Schmitter 1977), so findings will not be limited to one
country context. The issues were selected quasi-randomly
from the universe of issues on which public opinion polls
were conducted between 2005 and 2010 in the respective
country, and which indicate an opinion on desired fu-
ture policy change. Surely, polling in public opinion sur-
veys requires someminimumthreshold regarding societal
salience, yet issue selection from the polls was stratified
in a way to vary media salience,3 policy type,4 and levels
2The project is led by Anne Rasmussen (principal investigator) and
funded by the Danish Council for Independent Research and Ned-
erlandsOrganisation for Scientific Research. Formore information
about the project and its participants, see http://govlis.eu/.
3Media salience was measured based on keyword searches in one
national newspaper per country.
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of public support for policy change, to include variation
on these dimensions. This sample has the advantage of
selecting issues irrespective of legislative action or actual
policy change, so it is fit to assess how coalitions promote
desired policy change or prevent unwanted change (cf.
Nelson and Yackee 2012) on issues that are on the public
agenda. Issues in the sample include, for instance, increas-
ing the tax on larger vehicles (UK), allowingmore asylum
seekers (NL), introducing a differentiated value-added
tax (DK), paternity tests without the mother’s consent
(GE), and banning the construction of minarets (SE). A
list of all sampled issues can be found in Appendix A in
the supporting information (SI).
The sample of advocates active on these issues was
gathered in three separate data-gathering efforts, which
should jointly capture lobbying activity in different
venues (Flo¨the and Rasmussen 2019). First, media cover-
age on each issue was coded to identify advocates, mean-
ing interest groups, firms, and experts, who made state-
ments on the specific policy issue in themedia venue. Two
newspapers per country (center-left, center-right)5 were
coded for an observation period of up to 4 years.6 Second,
interviews with policy makers on 82% of the issues gath-
ered additional actors active in inside lobbying during the
observation period. Third, a desk research on formal con-
sultation tools used by parliaments or governments was
conducted to capture all actors participating in consulta-
tions or advisory boards on questions related to the sam-
pled issues. These strategies identified 1,667unique actors
on an issue in the five countries. Gathering contact infor-
mationwas successful for 1,410of these actors activeonan
issue,whomadeup the final sample for sending the survey
to gatherdataoncoalition lobbyingon the sampled issues.
Data at the Coalition Level
In order to separate out the hypothesized effects of
coalition diversity on the success of lobbying coalitions,
the main unit of analysis is an active coalition in the
sample of issues. This level of analysis also has the upside
of avoiding some of the potential endogeneity problems
4The policy types are regulatory, distributive, and redistributive.
5Denmark: Politiken and Jyllands-Posten; Germany: Su¨ddeutsche
Zeitung andFrankfurtherAllgemeineZeitung;Netherlands:DeVolk-
skrant andNRCHandelsblad; Sweden:Dagens Nyheter and Svenska
Dagbladet; United Kingdom: The Guardian and The Telegraph.
6The observation period starts with the public opinion item and
ends 4 years after, or when the surveyed policy change occurred
before.
to do with the fact that advocates may enter a coalition
depending on low expected success (when working
alone). By focusing on active coalitions, rather than
comparing preference attainment for single advocates
to those that have entered coalitions, this problem is
alleviated.
Out of the 1,410 advocates who received the online
survey, 478 completed it. The surveys in the five countries
have an overall completion rate of 33.9%,7 which ranks in
the range of the 25–45% response rate that interest group
surveys typically produce (Marchetti 2015). However, in
terms of assessing the coalition level, the survey’s coverage
can be expected to be much higher because in order to
capture an active coalition, only one of its members needs
to report on it. The average coalition size reported by
coalition members was 4.5 members, so probabilistically
speaking, it is likely that at least one member reported on
the coalition.8
To measure coalition behavior, a survey question ad-
dressed whether the advocate actively cooperated with
others on the specific policy issue in the form of a for-
mal coalition, which jointly campaigned or concertedly
approached policy makers. The question was posed with
a concrete explanation and examples of what types of
cooperation are included (see SI Appendix C) in order
to avoid ambiguity and increase comparability. The sub-
sequent survey question asked the respondent to name
the members of the formal coalition. Up to nine coop-
eration partners could be entered in free text boxes. To
operationalize coalition composition, these entries were
cleaned9 and classified in terms of the data required for
the independent variables. In all, 36% of respondents
reported to have been in a formal coalition on the is-
sue and entered the composition of 153 coalitions. How-
ever, given that different actors can report on the same
coalition, the data were recoded to avoid including the
same coalition several times when different members re-
ported on it.10 This resulted in identifying 130 distinct
coalitions.
7Table B.1 in SI Appendix B compares response rates across coun-
tries.
8Although nonresponse biases cannot be ruled out, SI Ta-
ble B.2 gives no indication of bias in relation to the de-
pendent variable of preference attainment at the advocate
level.
9Cleaning excluded entries on political parties or politicians and
adjusted entries in which partners were entered in plural (e.g.,
“unions”). A conservative rule was applied that this means two
partners, whose group type was coded.
10When two coalitions on an issue were the same in all or at least
three named partners, this was included only once.
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Dependent Variable: Lobbying Success as
Preference Attainment
Lobbying success of the coalition is measured in the form
of a binary variable noting whether the resulting policy
at the end of the observation period is in line with the
position on the issue reported by the survey respondent.
The underlying assumption is that cohesive issue coali-
tions form between like-minded advocates pursuing the
same position collectively, so the binary position (in fa-
vor of or against policy change) of the coalition member
is the coalition position. When the respondent did not
indicate a clear position (in favor of or against a policy)
in the survey, but other data gathering had resulted in
a clear position coding, this is included in the analysis.
Still, in eight cases, no clear position in favor of or against
policy change on the issue could be gathered, so the final
sample is reduced to 122 coalitions given that preference
attainment cannot be evaluated for unclear positions.
To construct the dependent variable of preference
attainment, the position of the coalition (member) was
related to the policy change that did or did not take place
on the issue at the end of the observation period. The
value 1 denotes preference attainment, meaning that the
coalition supported policy change that was implemented,
or opposed a change that did not take place, whereas 0
entails that the final policy outcome runs counter to the
coalition’s voiced preference. The policy outcomes on all
issueswere gathered in adesk research and cross-validated
by the interviews thatwere conductedwith policymakers.
Importantly, this binary operationalization is enabled by
a selection of issues from opinion polls that align in terms
of binary outcomes and measures success in terms of a
predefined policy result. It does not include smaller suc-
cesses in the desired direction, for instance, side deals or
exceptions that coalitions may secure, albeit an undesired
policy passes. The results need to be interpreted in these
terms of actual policy preference attainment.
Independent Variables: Coalition Diversity
and Advocacy Salience
Two alternative operationalizations of coalition diver-
sity are used. First, Diversity (inverse HHI) is the inverse
of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which was
originally used as a measure of market concentration.
Whereas the HHImeasures homogeneity across different
types of categories on a scale of up to 1, its inverse mea-
sures diversity, in this case coalition diversity, in terms of
different substantial group types included in the coali-
tion. The inverse index (1-HHI) ranges from 0 (most
homogenous; i.e., only one group type in the coalition)
to 1 minus 1/number of different group types, which is
the most diverse distribution (cf. Rasmussen and Carroll
2014, 453). To compute it, five different actor types were
taken into account, namely, (1) Business Associations and
Firms; (2) Trade Unions and Occupational Associations;
(3) Hobby, Identity, and Religious Groups; (4) Public In-
terest Groups; and (5) Experts, Think Tanks, and Institu-
tional Associations.11 Based on this, the HHI is calculated
by squaring the share of named coalitionmembers in each
category and then summing the squares. Themost diverse
coalition (with equal shares in all five actor types) would
approach 0.8 (1 – 1/5). As an alternative operational-
ization, a categorical variable named Bedfellows is used.
Its baseline (0) is a homogenous coalition including only
one actor type. This is compared to Strange Bedfellows (1),
meaning coalitions including Business Associations and
Firms and at least one of the other four nonbusiness ac-
tor types. Finally, it distinguishes Nonbusiness Bedfellows
(2), meaning coalitions between at least two of the four
nonbusiness actor types (types 2 to 5 above). These two
alternative operationalizations are only used in separate
models, as they measure diversity in different but highly
relatedways.Whereas the index treats the five group types
as equal and measures the degree of diversity between
all of them, the Bedfellows operationalization places less
weight on the degree of diversity, but taps into its type
and a potential special status of business actors.
In order to test the hypothesis on a moderating effect
of Advocacy Salience, salience in the lobbying community
is measured by the average number of lobbying actors
active on the issue in outside and inside lobbying venues
according to all data-gathering efforts. The average num-
ber of active advocates per year in the observation period
is calculated to account for differences in the length of
the observation period. Themeasure is logged in the final
analysis due toa skeweddistribution.Existing studieshave
used similar activity-based operationalizations of salience
in terms of the number of organizations expressing a pref-
erence on an issue (Bunea 2013), the number of EUonline
consultation submissions received (Klu¨ver 2011), or the
number of lobbying actors active on national policy is-
sues (Rasmussen, Ma¨der, and Reher 2018). As Beyers,
Du¨r, and Wonka (2018) argue, the broader concept of
salience can also be applied to actors other than lobbyists,
such as policy makers, the public, and the media. Yet, my
theoretical argument about the risk of disturbance in the
form of disfavored interests mobilizing against a policy
11The codebook used to gather this information on actor types
can be accessed at http://govlis.eu/codebooks-and-data/. An inter-
coder reliabilty test (effective n = 44, two coders) resulted in a
Krippendorff’s alpha of .93 in distinguishing these five actor type
categories.
WHEN DIVERSITY WORKS 667
applies most directly to advocacy salience, measured in
terms of mobilization in the lobbying community.
Control Variables
Additionally, the following control variables are included
at the level of coalitions. First, to attend to a potential
business bias (cf. Schattschneider 1960) at the coalition
level, and thereby an elitist alternative explanation to the
proposed pluralist view, the share of business actors in
the coalition is included. This maymake coalition success
more likely if politicians are more responsive to business
interests than other interests (e.g., Bunea 2013). The
variable Share Business is operationalized as the share of
named coalition members that are classified as Business
Associations and Firms and ranges from 0 (no business
members) to 1 (only business members). Second, the
literature has stressed the importance of resource pooling
in coalitions (Hula 1999; Mahoney 2007b). Arguably,
higher financial lobbying resources accumulated by the
coalition should increase its scope for employing effective
strategies and, thereby, its likelihood to succeed. Since
our online survey only captured resources of the survey
respondent, not by all coalition members, lobbying
expenses reported in the European Union Transparency
Register are used as a proxy for the lobbying budgets of
all coalition members. These expenditures were gathered
for each single named coalition member and then
aggregated at the coalition level. The variable Financial
Resource Proxy takes the log of the sum of all reported
lobbying expenditures in order to moderate the effect of
outliers. Third, to avoid a status quo bias affecting the
analysis (Baumgartner et al. 2009), the binary control
Coalition Pro Change includes whether the coalition
favors policy change (1) or the status quo (0). Fourth, it
can be expected to matter for preference attainment, and
plausibly bedfellow choice, to what extent a coalition has
public opinion on its side (Rasmussen, Ma¨der, and Reher
2018). Therefore, Support of Public Opinion measured as
the share of the public (out of all respondents) favoring
the same position as the coalition is included as a control.
Fifth, the size of the coalition entered by the respondent
is controlled for, as Nelson and Yackee (2012) suggest
that larger coalitions have a positive effect on preference
attainment. Given that decreasing returns to each addi-
tional partner might be expected, the log of the number
of coalition partners (ranging from 2 to 10) is included
as Size.12 Moreover, the strength of the positional “camp”
or “side” of an actor affects lobbying success (Klu¨ver
12Results are robust to using Size without the log transformation.
2013; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015), and it might
affect considerations of choosing coalition partners
(Hojnacki 1997). For this reason, the control Camp
Share is included, operationalized as the total number
of advocates on the issue with the same position as the
coalition, divided by the total sum of lobbying actors
on either side of the issue in the total sample of active
advocates. Finally, the context in which the coalition is
operating must be taken into account (Hojnacki 1997;
Mahoney 2007b), so fixed effects for countries control
for unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
SI Table D.1 summarizes the distribution of the in-
dependent variables and controls, and Table D.2 shows
their correlation matrix. All correlations are well below
typical thresholds for multicolinearity problems, except
for the categorical operationalization ofBedfellows, which
is highly correlated with the Share of Business actors in the
coalition. This makes sense because the categorical mea-
sure is created based on distinguishing diverse coalitions
that include business (Strange Bedfellows) or not (Non-
business Bedfellows). For this reason, the Business control
is only included in the models in which diversity is mea-
sured by the Diversity Index (inverse HHI), which only
has a correlation of r = .19 with the Share of Business.
Additional multicolinearity tests estimating the variance
inflation factor (VIF) on linear regressions of Models 1
and 3 show low levels of variance inflation with values of
VIF < 2 for the independent variables and VIF < 4 for
the control variables.13
Analysis
This section presents the results of multilevel logistic re-
gressions to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. The models include
random intercepts for policy issues because one can ex-
pect that lobbying behavior and success are more alike
within the same issue than across issues, so we cannot as-
sume errors to be independent. The random intercepts for
issues capture this variation without estimating the effect
of other specific issue characteristics. Given the relatively
lowNof coalitions (122) and issues (37), this is preferable.
Table 2 shows a total of four models employed to
test the two alternative operationalizations of coalition
diversity in form of the Diversity Index (inverse HHI) in
Models 1 and 2 and the categorical Bedfellows variable in
Models 3 and 4.
Models 1 and 3 test Hypothesis 1 under these two
operationalizations of diversity as the inverted HHI
(Model 1) and by comparing Strange Bedfellows and
13Only for the country dummies, 2> VIF< 4 occurs.
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TABLE 2 Multilevel Logistic Regressions of Coalition Preference Attainment
Index Operationalization Categorical Operationalization
Simple Moderated Simple Moderated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diversity (inv. HHI) –1.77 –10.36∗∗
(1.11) (3.31)
Bedfellows (Baseline: Homogenous)
Strange Bedfellows –1.15 –6.52∗∗
(0.69) (2.08)
Nonbusiness Bedfellows –0.43 –4.53∗
(0.65) (1.91)
Advocacy Salience 0.13 –0.66 0.17 –0.69
(0.25) (0.36) (0.26) (0.38)
Diversity × Advocacy Salience 2.99∗∗
(1.03)
Bedfellows × Advocacy Salience
Strange Bedfellows × Advocacy Salience 1.70∗∗
(0.59)
Nonbusiness Bedfellows × Advocacy Salience 1.41∗
(0.64)
Share of Business 0.65 0.06
(0.90) (0.92)
Financial Resource Proxy(log) 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Coalition Pro Change –0.96 –1.13∗ –1.11∗ –1.19∗
(0.54) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55)
Support of Public Opinion 4.38∗∗ 4.06∗ 4.00∗ 3.62∗
(1.66) (1.59) (1.64) (1.59)
Size (log) –0.24 –0.43 –0.19 –0.16
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53)
Camp Share 3.51∗ 4.24∗∗ 3.00 3.73∗
(1.63) (1.59) (1.65) (1.61)
Country (Baseline: Germany)
UK 2.00 2.63∗ 2.09 2.76∗
(1.15) (1.18) (1.16) (1.21)
Denmark –0.16 1.05 0.09 1.40
(1.18) (1.22) (1.21) (1.30)
Sweden 3.01∗ 3.06∗ 3.39∗ 3.59∗∗
(1.31) (1.25) (1.36) (1.30)
Netherlands 1.94 2.28∗ 2.14∗ 2.59∗
(1.03) (1.03) (1.07) (1.04)
Constant –4.66∗ –2.71 –4.49∗ –2.66
(1.85) (1.91) (1.81) (1.85)
Policy Issue Intercept Variance 0.60 0.22 0.66 0.16
(0.77) (0.58) (0.80) (0.60)
Number of Cases 122 122 122 122
Number of Issues 37 37 37 37
AIC 155 148 155 148
Chi2 20 24∗ 21 27∗
Note: Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses.
∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001.
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Nonbusiness Bedfellows to the baseline of homogenous
coalitions (Model 3). They show no significant effect of
diversity on coalition success, when holding advocacy
salience constant. So Hypothesis 1 on a general beneficial
effect of diversity on lobbying success is not supported.
Models 2 and 4 add considerably to this initial anal-
ysis by revealing significant positive interaction effects
between coalition diversity and advocacy salience (Model
2: p = .004; Model 4: p = .004 with Strange Bedfellows,
and p = .028 with Nonbusiness Bedfellows). Importantly,
this pattern is not just driven by a lack of variation in,
or a different distribution of, coalition diversity on either
low- or high-salience issues. When splitting the sample
along the median observed log salience (which equals
21.1 active actors per year on average), we see that there
is a slightly higher mean coalition diversity on issues with
lower salience (0.32) compared to high salience (0.27),
but the difference in means in not significantly differ-
ent from 0, and the standard deviation in the two sam-
ples is alike (0.25).14 Furthermore, descriptive diagnostic
plots of coalition success and diversity at these intervals of
salience (see SI Figure D.1) and of success and salience at
intervals of diversity (SI Figure D.2) show sufficient vari-
ation on both the dependent variable and independent
variable across values of the moderator.15 The reversed
slopes of the fitted lines based on the raw data give a very
first indication of a potential conditional relationship that
can be estimated based on sufficient variation in the data.
Table 2 shows that the addition of these interaction effects
to the models of coalition success increases model fit, as
measured by the AIC and chi2 both fromModel 1 to 2 and
from Model 3 to 4. The better-fitted models suggest that
the effect of coalition diversity varies strongly across dif-
ferent levels of advocacy salience:Whereas the constituent
termson theDiversity Index (Model 2) and the twodiverse
Bedfellow categories (Model 4) are significantly negative
(p = .002, and p = .002 and p = .018, respectively), the
significant positive interaction terms show that coalition
diversity is increasingly positively correlated with coali-
tion success as salience increases.16
Marginal effect plots and predicted probabilities of
coalition success at different levels of advocacy salience
allow insights about how pronounced these relationships
14See SI Table D.3. Also see SI Table D.4 comparing mean coalition
size (no significant difference).
15Also see SI Figure D.3, distinguishing the categories of Bedfellows.
16Robustness in multilevel linear models is checked in SI Appendix
E. All interaction effects remain positive and equally significant
(p = .004 in Model E.2; p = .003 and p = .023 in Model E.4).
FIGURE 1 Marginal Effects of Diversity with
95% CIs based onModel 2
Note: Thin bars below indicate the share of observations.
really are.17 Figure 1 shows in line with Table 2 that coali-
tion diversity has a significant negative marginal effect
at lower levels of salience, but as salience increases, the
effect becomes significantly positive. For illustrative pur-
poses, the log-transformed values in the figure were la-
beled with their actual values; at an average advocacy
salience of roughly 99 active actors on an issue per year,
this marginal effect turns significantly positive. At this
level of salience, a homogenous coalition has a predicted
probability to succeed of 50%, whereas a coalition with
the mean observed diversity (inv HHI = 0.29, equaling,
for instance, five business actors joining forces with one
other group type) is predicted to have a 67% probability
of success. A coalition with maximum observed diver-
sity (inv HHI = 0.75, equaling a four-member coalition
composed of four different actor types) has a predicted
probability to succeed of 86%. Conversely, the marginal
effect of diversity is significantly negative below an aver-
age advocacy salience of roughly 16 active advocates on
the issue per year. At this level of salience, a homoge-
nous coalition has a predicted probability to succeed of
70%, whereas a coalition with mean observed diversity is
predicted at 61%, and the most diverse observed coali-
tion has a predicted probability to succeed of only 45%.
Table 3 summarizes the different predicted probabilities
at these two levels of advocacy salience calculatedbasedon
Model 2. It illustrates that these align as theorized based
on higher political responsiveness and higher incentives
to overcome internal cooperation costs on more salient,
compared to less salient, issues.
In sum, the relationship between coalition diversity
and coalition success varies significantly at different levels
17In the calculations, other variables are held constant at observed
values in the dataset.
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FIGURE 2 Effects of Diverse Bedfellows (Compared to Homogenous Coalitions) with 95% CIs
based onModel 4
TABLE 3 Predicted Probabilities of Coalition
Success in Percent
Lower Salience Higher Salience
(16 Advocates/
Year)
(99 Advocates/
Year)
Min. Diversity
(0)
70 50
Mean Diversity
(0.29)
61 67
Max. Diversity
(0.75)
45 86
of advocacy salience. Coalition diversity is associatedwith
significantly higher coalition success only at high levels of
advocacy salience. These findings support Hypothesis 2
and are consistent with the theory formulated on differ-
ential costs and benefits of diverse coalitions depending
on advocacy salience.
The alternative operationalization of diversity as a
categorical variable in Model 4 provides further support.
Figure 2 shows the same substantive findings as Figure 1.
The panels compare the two kinds of diverse coalitions
of Strange Bedfellows and Nonbusiness Bedfellows to the
baseline of a homogenous coalition. Both plots show a
significant negative effect at lower levels of salience and a
significant positive effect at high levels of salience for the
two types of diverse coalitions compared to homogenous
ones.
The effects turn significantly positive at an advocacy
salience of roughly 164 active advocates on average per
year for Strange Bedfellows and slightly earlier, at roughly
148 advocates, for Nonbusiness Bedfellows. Overall, the
very similar curves suggest that there is no major differ-
ence between diverse coalitions that do or do not include
business actors. Based on these results, there is no evi-
dence that there is a business bias at the level of advocacy
coalitions, with higher responsiveness to coalitions that
include business actors.
The control variables give no such evidence either.
Neither the Share of Business actors in the coalition nor
the pooled financial resources reveal a significant effect
in any of the models. However, a number of other control
variables have significant effects in the typically expected
directions. In line with existing research at the level of
individual advocates (cf. Baumgartner et al. 2009), the
models show that it is hard for coalitions to change the
status quo (p< .05 in threemodels). Investigating further,
whether and when diverse coalitions have advantages
when trying to keep or change the cemented status quo
could, in fact, be a fruitful avenue for future research.18
In any case, Table 2 also supports findings by Rasmussen,
Ma¨der, and Reher (2018) at this level of analysis by
showing that coalitions enjoying higher support of public
opinion for their position have a significantly higher
18There is no evidence in the dataset that diverse coalitions, in
general, find it easier to change the status quo than less diverse
coalitions (see SI: Table G.1). The formulated theory could, how-
ever, also be extended to take into account that the benefits and
costs of diversity at different levels of salience may differ for coali-
tions that favor the status quo, as opposed to policy change. In the
present dataset, there is a higher number of coalitions advocating
for policy change (70) than the status quo (52), but mean diversity
and mean salience do not vary significantly between these sub-
samples (SI: Table G.2). Unfortunately, these split samples are too
small to allow testingwhether the interaction between diversity and
salience holds equally in both subsamples. The article’s conclusions
are therefore limited to the pooled sample.
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likelihood to succeed (p < .05 or p < .01 in all models).
Similarly, having a larger advocacy camp (cf. Klu¨ver 2013;
Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015), among which the
coalition has mobilized, has a significant positive effect
(p< .05 or p< .01 in three of themodels). The size of the
coalition has no significant effect on coalition preference
attainment, supporting Phinney’s (2017) qualitative
findings suggesting that the composition of the coalition
is more important than the number of members. Finally,
there seem to be country differences, with significantly
higher coalition preference attainment in the UK (p< .05
in two models), Sweden (p < .05), and the Netherlands
(p< .05 in three models), compared to Germany.
Robustness at the Actor Level
Although the analysis was conducted at the level of coali-
tions, the theory has observable implications for individ-
ual advocates and the effects of their coalition strategies.
Previous studies, which found an aggregate negative effect
of coalition membership on individual lobbying success
(Haider-Markel 2006; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004),
might be driven by certain types of coalitions and/or is-
sues. Based on the theory formulated here, we would
expect that as the level of advocacy salience increases,
the benefit for an individual lobbyist who cooperates in
a coalition with unlike bedfellows should increase and
be more likely to exceed the success of working alone.
SI Table F.1 tests this expectation based on a categori-
cal variable distinguishing homogenous coalitions from
the differently composed diverse bedfellows, compared
to the baseline of lobbying alone (SI Appendix F). The
results of multilevel logistic regressions run at the level
of individual advocates (N = 418) show that there is a
significant positive interaction effect (p = .039 and p =
.036 in Models F2 and F3) between advocacy salience
and cooperation in strange bedfellow coalitions, com-
pared to the baseline of no cooperation in a coalition
(also see SI Figure F.1). Moreover, there are significant
differences between the marginal effects of homogenous
and strange bedfellow coalitions, and the directions of
predicted marginal effects for these two types of cooper-
ation reverse as salience increases (SI Figure F.2). For in-
dividual advocates, this means that the choice of whether
to lobby in a flock or alone in order to maximize lob-
bying success is a highly context-dependent trade-off. It
should not only depend on the actor’s own characteristics
and the issue at stake (Hojnacki 1997; Mahoney 2007b;
Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004), but also on the inter-
play of the issue context with the specific coalition that is
formed.
Conclusion: The Flipsides of Diverse
Support
Based on a sample of 122 coalitions active on 37 policy
issues in five countries, this article has provided the first
analysis of lobbying success at the level of lobbying coali-
tions actively joining forces on specific policy issues. The
results show that diversity in the types of interests united
in a coalition for a common cause is no panacea, but that
it is highly context dependent whether diverse coalitions
attract higher costs or benefits compared to homogenous
coalitionswhen lobbying together to influence policy out-
comes. Put in thewords of Schattschneider (1960, 20), the
“outcome of the political game depends on the scale on
which it is played”: Coalition diversity becomes pivotal
when the scope is higher in that more advocates are in the
game.
Whereas onemight initially expect that diverse coali-
tions signaling broad support for their position to policy
makers should generally be more likely to attain their
preferences than homogenous coalitions, the analysis
revealed that this only holds as advocacy salience of an
issue increases. It was theorized that both the contribu-
tion incentives for coalition members within the diverse
coalition, as well as the incentives for policy makers to
respond to signals of broad support, are lower when ex-
ternal pressures in the formofmobilized interests are low,
but they increase as an issue becomes increasingly salient
in the lobbying community. The empirical results lend
support to this theory, showing that average advocacy
salience has a strong moderating effect on the relation-
ship between coalition diversity and success. At low levels
of advocacy salience, homogenous coalitions are more
likely to succeed in attaining their preferences, whereas
the effect is reversed on highly salient issues, for which
more diverse coalitions are significantly more likely to
get policy outcomes in line with their goals. Notably, this
pattern does not seem to be driven by unequal mobiliza-
tion of diverse and homogenous coalitions, and the raw
data display sufficient variation to assess the conditional
relationship. This was estimated as a linear interaction
based on the formulated theory of increasing benefits
and decreasing costs of diversity as salience increases.
By analyzing the sample of active coalitions, the research
design avoided some common endogeneity problems to
do with coalition formation that might affect analyses
of the effect of coalition action at the level of individual
lobbyists. Even though the sample of active coalitions is
relatively small, because collecting data on a large number
of issue-specific coalitions is highly labor intensive, the
sample plausibly captures the universe of active coalitions
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on issues on the public agenda in Western European
countries.
The analysis at the coalition level helped clarify
how positive effects of coalition signals depend on the
coalition’s composition and are moderated by advocacy
salience. This can also explain why it has been so hard
to trace a general beneficial effect of coalition lobbying
(Haider-Markel 2006; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004).
Additionally, the results on coalition diversity speak to
larger questions regarding the political responsiveness to
different types of interests (Schattschneider 1960;Truman
1958). There is no evidence in the analyses that coalitions
with higher shares of business actors have higher prefer-
ence attainment across issues, or that diverse coalitions
including business actors (“strange bedfellows”) have ad-
vantages over nonbusiness bedfellows. Instead, the re-
sults suggest that homogenous coalitions (irrespective
of group type) find it easier to capture policy outcomes
on low-salience issues. Especially if political responsive-
ness to support signals varies more generally across is-
sues in this way (cf. Klu¨ver 2011; Rasmussen, Ma¨der, and
Reher 2018), this is a problematic pattern for democracy,
as it points to a higher likelihood of policy capture when
the external pressure of high existing advocacy salience
is lacking. Given there is little lobbying activity on a vast
share of issues,whereas advocates bandwagonon some se-
lected issues (Baumgartner andLeech2001;Halpin2011),
this risk can be expected to affect a large share of issues.
Conversely, diverse support signals would only have ben-
eficial effects on comparatively fewer salient issues in the
advocate community, which are not necessarily the ones
affecting the largest groups of citizens or constituents
(Olson 1965).
One might ask, however: (Why) would groups not
anticipate this and only form diverse coalitions on salient
issues? The variation in the data, where diverse coalitions
occur both on low- and high-salience issues, suggests this
is not the case.19 Thismight imply that the choice of coali-
tion partners also fulfills roles other than directly maxi-
mizing (expected) coalition success.Other considerations
could, for instance, relate to interpersonal relations be-
tween staffers, or organizational path dependencies based
on previous cooperation. Alternatively, it might suggest
that the development of issues in a lobbying campaign is
actually difficult to anticipate. A perspective not assessed
in the article is the temporal dimension of coalition for-
mation and salience. Diverse coalitions may be formed
while an issue is low in salience, with the intention to in-
crease salience over time. Such a strategy would pay off
to the extent to which issue salience then actually in-
19See SI: Table D.3 and Figure D.1.
creases, but it would be costly on issues that fail to attract
wider discussions and credible pressures of disturbance
and electoral consequences. Unfortunately, the present
data set is not suited to assess such development over
time, but future research should consider these temporal
dynamics between salience and coalition lobbying.
Finally, the strong moderating effect of salience also
has other methodological implications regarding issue
selection in studies of lobbying and public policy. It
might not always be beneficial to study both salient and
nonsalient issues together. Although we often strive to
select samples from the universe of all issues, it may be
favorable to study the smaller subset of highly salient
issues more closely, if (coalition) lobbying success plays
by different rules on them. Moreover, future research
should continue collecting data on active lobbying
coalitions acting concertedly to affect policy outcomes. It
may, in fact, constitute a potentially problematic bias in
the research field that it focuses primarily on single orga-
nizations as the main unit of analysis, and assumes these
units to be independent. In reality, individual lobbyists
compete with both loosely connected and highly cohesive
sets of cooperating actors. Some of these coalitions might
actually be better understoodwhen conceptualized as sin-
gle units, where different “organs” perform functionally
distinguished tasks, but success is conditioned by
how (and when) these come together. This article has
contributed to sucha researchagendabyanalyzing the sig-
naling role of diverse coalitions on specific policy issues.
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